At the end of the First World War, Albert Einstein, living in Berlin at that time, collaborated with Leo Szilárd, a young Hungarian scientist to invent together, an energy refrigerator. This collaboration will lead Einstein to participate, against his values, in the creation of what will rather be the atomic bomb during the forties.
When Adolf Hitler was elected Chancellor of the Reich in 1933, he discovered the principle developed by Einstein and Szilárd, who remained in contact after their first collaboration. The phenomenon discovered is that of nuclear physics. A neutron causes the fission of the nucleus of an atom, which releases several neutrons which, in turn, cause fissions. This chain reaction can then cause terrible explosions. In 1939, Szilárd predicted that scientists at the boot of the chancellor who had become dictator could use this discovery to create an atomic bomb! He then asks Einstein, who lives in the United States, to urgently warn the American president Roosevelt. The German physicist is alarmed by the use of his invention as a destructive weapon because he did not think it would be used as such! Together with other scientists, they write to the American president to inform him of the consequences and the danger of an atomic bomb if it will be built by Nazis. They could, of course, win the war, but also sign the end of humanity! It was Albert Einstein who drew President Roosevelt's attention to atomic research in Germany who took the scientists' alert very seriously and after the invasion of Poland by Hitler's troops, he created the Advisory Committee for Uranium. This project called Project Manhattan is a secret program that develops an atomic bomb. By Leo Szilard and Eugene Wigner who fled the Nazi regime, he knows that German physicists are preparing "extremely powerful bombs of a new type." Roosevelt lets himself be convinced that the United States must embark on the adventure. Enrico Fermi, J. Robert Oppenheimer, Niels Bohr and a group of young scientists are collaborating on the ultra-secret research project. Among the insiders who are under the command of General Groves, it goes without saying that if one day the bomb becomes operational, it will serve against Germany and Japan. It is also self-evident that a secret like this is not shared. At most the British and the Canadians are associated, but not the Soviets of which the United States is suspicious, despite the war alliance.
It is recalled that Stimson and Groves revealed the secret to Truman on April 25. It is too late to think of dropping the bomb on Germany, which has been defeated by conventional means. The case of Japan remains. Under Stimson's chairmanship, a special committee of scientists was set up to consider the use of the bomb. On 2 July, he delivered his conclusions. To end the war, Stimson writes, it would take a landing in the Japanese archipelago, a long, very difficult operation that will cause hundreds of thousands of deaths. Japan should therefore be given an ultimatum to accept unconditional surrender. This warning will include "the diverse character and numerical superiority of the forces that we are willing to send to the islands, the inevitable and complete destruction that will result from the use of these forces." However, Stimson recommends adding that the United States does not exclude a "constitutional monarchy exercised by this dynasty." With the exception of the last point, Stimson's conclusions are followed to the letter. On July 16, an experimental bomb exploded in Alamogordo, New Mexico. Truman is informed to Potsdam and warns Stalin in vague terms. On July 26, the United States, Britain and China sent an ultimatum to Japan: "We call on the government of Japan to proclaim the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces. […] Otherwise, Japan will be destroyed immediately and completely. "Ultimatum rejected on 28 July. Truman made his decision and has no state of mind. It doesn't matter if scientists suddenly change their minds and start to fear the effects of a weapon they helped invent. For Truman and his military advisers, Japan is facing defeat and, despite the terrible destruction that has reached its civilian and military potential, continues to fight with fierce determination. His suicide planes, piloted by suicide bombers, destroyed American ships. In the Philippines, Iwo Jima and Okinawa, fierce fighting has claimed thousands of lives. According to the American General Staff, seventeen Japanese divisions were concentrated on Kiou-Siou Island to repel a foreign invasion. If the Americans tried to land, they could expect to lose 1 million of their own, and the war would not end until 1946, or even 1947. The civilian population would be prepared to stand up on foot, and the survivors confirm by their testimony the prevailing state of mind. Fearsome prospects that would make any Head of State thrill! It is these considerations that explain Roosevelt's attitude in Yalta. He obtained Stalin's secret promise that, three months after the capitulation of Germany, the Soviet Union, still neutral in the Asian war, would take the Japanese to the other side. Germany capitulated on May 8. Three months later, on August 8, two days after Hiroshima, the day before Nagasaki. Would there be a link?
It is here that the historians of the new left intervene, a revisionist tendency, very vivid in the sixties, which has no sympathy for the Nazis, the Japanese or the Soviets, but which does not believe in the good intentions of the United States and gladly makes Washington the initiator of the Cold War. Their reasoning is based on good questions. Why did the Americans not attempt to resort to conventional bombing before deciding on the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Why did politicians not listen to the experts who assured that Japan would sign its surrender before the end of 1945, even if the bomb was not used, even if the USSR did not go to war, even if the IGs did not land in the Japanese archipelago? Why bomb Nagasaki after Hiroshima, if it were enough to convince the Japanese of the terrible effects of the bomb? Why did the United States adopt an uncompromising attitude towards Tokyo, particularly with regard to the possible retention of Emperor Hiro-Hito, as soon as the first attempt at Alamogordo was successful? Why, at the end of July, did they no longer want Soviet aid ?
Unfortunately, revisionist historians give excessively simplistic answers to these good questions. Truman did not lead an "atomic diplomacy," although possession of the new weapon reinforced his hand in negotiations with the Soviets. When Potsdam Stalin learns from the president that the United States has a new weapon, he hopes that the United States will make "good use" of it against Japan. Truman acted like Roosevelt: little information to the Soviets, the minimum cooperation. He soon proposed the establishment of international control over the use of the atom, which the Soviets did not want. If the US wants less and less Soviet intervention against Japan, it is because it is expensive, that Stalin seeks territorial advantages in China and Korea. Basically, it may also be that the Soviets will keep their promise of Yalta on August 8, because the Hiroshima bomb has exploded and they fear being deprived of their booty if Japan lays down its weapons. In the final analysis, if Truman had developed an "atomic diplomacy," it would be necessary to conclude that he had failed. Possessing the atomic monopoly, wrongly convinced that they would hold it for a long time to come, the Americans did not get much from the Soviets in 1945-1946. They did not avoid the creation of a Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. In fact, from February 1946 to April 1948, the United States had a dozen atomic bombs that were not ready for use. Until December 1947, there were not enough assembly teams. The B29 bombers must be modified to fulfil their atomic mission and very few are. Uranium 235 production has been slowed. Deterrence is by no means a coercive force and certainly gives Americans an exaggerated sense of their power.
All things considered, the explosion of the two bombs of August 1945 is part of a plan that the Americans drew up, consciously or not. They want to erase once and for all the humiliation they suffered at Pearl Harbor, to convince Japan that total destruction threatens it, although they cannot then, for lack of having manufactured it, resort to a third bomb and today's experts question the effectiveness of strategic bombing. They also aspire to ensure, as far as possible, the security of their country and wish to contribute to the definitive restoration of peace. But is this not an illusion that the post-war era will not fail to destroy?
